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Whereas Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) has long been envisioned as a structuralist, quantitative, and 
positivist sociologist, some materials that Durkheim produced in the later stages of his career—namely, 
Moral Education (1961 [1902-1903]), The Evolution of Educational Thought (1977 [1904-1905]), The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life (1915 [1912]), and Pragmatism and Sociology (1983 [1913-1914]) attest to a very dif-
ferent conception of sociology—one with particular relevance to the study of human knowing, acting, 
and interchange. 
Although scarcely known in the social sciences, Emile Durkheim’s (1993 [1887]) “La Science Positive de 
la Morale en Allemagne” [“The Scientific Study of Morality in Germany”] is an exceptionally important 
statement for establishing the base of much of Durkheim’s subsequent social thought and for compre-
hending the field of sociology more generally. This includes the structuralist-pragmatist divide and 
the more distinctively humanist approach to the study of community life that Durkheim most visibly 
develops later (1961 [1902-1903]; 1977 [1904-1905]; 1915 [1912]; 1983 [1913-1914]) in his career.
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There is only one way to understand collective phenom-
ena, that is to study them in themselves. In other words, 
it is social psychology (die Völkerpsychologie) that alone 
can furnish the moral theorist with the materials he or she 
needs; this, according to Wundt, is the gateway (die Vorh-
alle) to ethics. It is in the history of language, of religion, of 
customs, and civilization in general that we can discover 
the traces of this development of which individual con-
sciousness contains and knows only the initial impulses. 
Emile Durkheim 1887 (Hall 1993:92 Ethics and the 
Sociology of Morals [E&SM])1
Ironically, one of the most consequential state-ments on “pragmatist” or “social realist” thought 
in Germany was developed by the French schol-
ar Emile Durkheim (1993 [1887]). Although cast in 
reference to “the scientific study of morality” rath-
er than “social realism” or “pragmatism” per se, 
Durkheim contends that several German scholars, 
of whom Wilhelm Wundt is most consequential, 
had developed an especially promising, interrelat-
ed set of approaches for studying community life 
in the social sciences. Still, Durkheim was unable 
and/or did not consider it appropriate to openly 
stress his indebtedness to the German social real-
ists when pursuing his career as a French academic. 
Thus, it is only later, as a more established scholar, 
1 The page references in this paper to Emile Durkheim’s “La 
Science Positive de la Morale en Allemagne” [“The Scientific 
Study of Morality in Germany”] are from Robert T. Hall’s 
English translation—as found on pages 57-135 of Hall’s (1993) 
Emile Durkheim: Ethics and the Sociology of Morals [E&SM]. I am 
very much indebted to Robert Hall for his translation and 
exceptionally insightful introduction to this text. Indeed, of 
the various commentators on Durkheim’s works, it is Robert 
T. Hall who has most centrally grasped the importance of this 
1887 statement for Durkheim’s subsequent scholarship.
that Durkheim (1902-1914) more directly reengages 
[the pragmatist tradition] that he had found so in-
tellectually compelling in his earlier contact with 
German social realism.2
In what follows, I consider the implications of 
a study leave in Germany taken by Emile Durkheim 
in 1885-1886 for the humanist/pragmatist sociology 
that would become prominent in Durkheim’s later 
scholarly works (1915 [1912]; 1961 [1902-1903]; 1977 
[1904-1905];1983 [1913-1914]). In developing this state-
ment, I build on Durkheim’s (1993 [1887]) article, “La 
Science Positive de la Morale en Allemagne” (“The 
Scientific Study of Morality in Germany”) which 
appears in Robert T. Hall’s English translation pub-
lished in Emile Durkheim: Ethics and the Sociology of 
Morals [E&SM] in 1993.
2 In an attempt to succinctly capture the overarching essence of 
Durkheim’s 1887 statement, Robert Alun Jones (1985; 1994; 1999; 
2002) uses the term “social realism.” This seems entirely appro-
priate to me, especially since it reminds readers of the particular 
cultural context in which Durkheim’s statement was developed. 
Nonetheless, readers are advised that in this paper I am using 
the terms “social realism,” “social pragmatism,” and “pragma-
tism” in essentially interchangeable ways. Durkheim does not 
use any of these terms in his 1887 statement, but readers will 
recognize considerable overall affinity between these approach-
es to the study of human knowing, acting, and interchange and 
the concepts embedded in the specific articles Emile Durkheim 
discusses in the 1887 paper. 
In addition to earlier discussions of “folk psychology” (die 
Völkerpsychologie) in German scholarship, the term “social re-
alism” as used herein has many conceptual affinities with 
Aristotelian social thought (especially see Nicomachean Ethics 
and Rhetoric), as well as with what would later become known 
as American pragmatism, symbolic interactionism, social con-
structionism, interpretivism, and phenomenological sociolo-
gy (see: Prus 1996; 2003; 2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 
2013a; 2015; 2017). 
Most centrally, following Wilhelm Wundt (Ethics), Durkheim’s 
emphasis is on studying the developmentally shaped, collective-
ly enacted, and linguistically enabled conceptual foundations 
of community life. It is within the context of ongoing human 
life-worlds that all realms and instances of human knowing, 
acting, and interchange become meaningful and achieve some 
historically constituted continuity. Envisioned thusly, Emile 
Durkheim’s depiction of “the social realist study of morality” 
represents an exceptionally enabling prototype for the study of 
all contexts and arenas of human group life.
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Few sociologists seem familiar with Durkheim’s 
1887 statement and even fewer have considered the 
implications of Durkheim’s encounter with “Ger-
man social realism” (Jones 1999) during a study 
leave as a junior scholar—either for Durkheim’s ca-
reer as a sociologist or for the field of sociology and 
the study of human knowing and acting more spe-
cifically.3
Albeit notably compacted, Durkheim’s 1887 text is 
important not only for (a) identifying some central 
features of Durkheim’s approach to the study of hu-
man group life but also for (b) locating the concep-
tual core of these aspects of Durkheim’s intellectual 
heritage and (c) enabling readers more adequately 
to appreciate some of the tensions that appear in 
Durkheim’s subsequent analyses of community life.
Relatedly, this much overlooked statement also 
(d) alerts us to the role that some German scholars 
(especially Wilhelm Wundt) played in the devel-
opment of Durkheim’s pragmatist sociological ap-
3 In developing this statement on Durkheim’s encounter with 
German social realism, I also benefited from Robert Alun 
Jones’ (1999) insightful historical commentary on Durkheim’s 
career as a scholar—and in particular Jones’ attentiveness to 
the contributions of Wilhelm Wundt to Durkheim’s 1887 state-
ment on the study of morality in Germany. While I am par-
ticularly grateful to Steven Lukes (1973) for the broad array 
of materials that he provides on Durkheim’s scholarly career 
and publications, Lukes substantially understates the impor-
tance of Durkheim’s encounter with German realism, as well 
as the humanist/pragmatist proclivities one encounters in 
Emile Durkheim’s later works. Although providing an excep-
tionally extensive and highly detailed depiction of Durkheim’s 
personal life and career, Marcel Fournier’s (2013) biographical 
statement on Emile Durkheim also gives very little attention 
to what I have termed Durkheim’s “sociological pragmatism” 
in his 1887 paper or in his later works (1902-1914). Fournier ac-
knowledges Durkheim’s subsequent attentiveness to history 
and ethnography as central features of the sociological enter-
prise in some of his later work, but, much like Lukes, Fournier 
is inattentive to the historical continuities of pragmatist Greek 
thought (from Aristotle via Wundt) in Durkheim’s “The 
Scientific Study of Morality in Germany.”
proach to the study of human group life and (e) de-
notes another set of connections between classical 
Greek scholarship and contemporary pragmatist 
thought.
It is commonly assumed that Durkheim’s sociology 
was primarily inspired by the positivist philosophy 
of Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Indeed, Durkheim’s 
best-known works (The Division of Labor in Society 
[1893], The Rules of Sociological Method [1895], and Sui-
cide [1897]) represent a structural-determinist, as well 
as a quantitative alternative (Suicide) to interpretivist/
pragmatist viewpoints. Likewise, whereas one can 
locate some pragmatist themes in these three texts, 
emphases of these latter sorts generally have been 
envisioned as distinctively theoretically and meth-
odologically marginal to his overall project.
Still, even though Durkheim’s best-known texts 
(1947 [1893]; 1951 [1897]; 1958 [1895]) are noted for 
their structuralist, quantitative, and deductively ra-
tionalist emphases, it is likely that these texts also 
would have been more positivist, individualistic, 
and psychological in thrust—had Durkheim not 
had earlier contact with the German social realists.
Durkheim’s education, if we may judge from some 
philosophy lectures that Durkheim delivered in 
1883-1884 (Gross and Jones 2004), was very much 
the product of French social thought at his time. 
Thus, whereas Durkheim appears to possess a solid 
French philosophical background with a particu-
lar proclivity for analytic detail, the philosophical 
stances encountered in these lectures reflect the 
(structuralist, reductionist, deductive) rationalism 
of René Descartes (1596-1650), the raw individualism 
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championed by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), 
and the (structuralist, largely ahistorical) scientific 
emphasis of the scholars who became central at the 
time of the French Revolution.4
Albeit seemingly limited, Durkheim appears to 
have had some exposure to classical Greek thought 
(notably including aspects of Aristotle’s Nicoma-
chean Ethics).5 Still, Durkheim’s material on Greek 
scholarship is not presented in particularly distinct 
terms but rather is interfused with French structur-
alism, scientism, and individualism. Accordingly, in 
his 1883-1884 lectures, human behavior is explained 
primarily in terms of individual psychological cog-
nitions and tendencies. There is very little emphasis 
on the group or community life in Durkheim’s early 
lectures on philosophy.
As Lukes (1973:86-95) observes, Durkheim had 
a long standing interest in morality, and his 1887 
article on ethics and morality emerged as a result 
of a study leave that took him to several German 
universities. The French government had sponsored 
4 This would include the encyclopedicists Denis Diderot (1713-
1784) and Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717-1783), among others, 
who championed a more notably rationalist, structuralist, 
ahistorical, allegedly scientific approach.
5 Although Aristotle is often described as an objectivist or raw 
empiricist and Plato as an idealist, these characterizations not 
only disregard particularly consequential pragmatist motifs in 
Plato’s texts (Prus 2009a, 2011a, 2011b, 2013b; Prus and Camara 
2010) but also dismally fail to acknowledge the broader, more 
explicit nature of Aristotle’s pragmatist approach to the study 
of the human condition (see: Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric, 
Politics, Poetics, and Categories; also see: Prus 2003; 2004; 2007a; 
2008; 2009a; 2013a; 2013c; 2015; Prus and Camara 2010). Over 
the millennia Aristotle’s scholarship has been represent-
ed in many different ways and across highly diverse realms 
of community life, but it is Aristotelian pragmatism (see” Prus 
1999; 2003; 2004; Puddephatt and Prus 2007) that provides the 
conceptual foundations of 20th century American pragmatism 
(and pragmatism’s sociological offshoot, symbolic interaction-
ism), as well as the somewhat earlier German social realist tra-
dition that Durkheim discusses.
study leaves for promising young French scholars 
so that they might learn about the latest thought 
and research being developed in Germany.
Although many of his colleagues were notably dis-
affected with their study leave encounters in Ger-
man academia, Durkheim (1993 [1887]) describes his 
contacts with particular German scholars as having 
given him a particularly clear conceptual paradigm 
and research agenda, as well as a much sharpened 
methodological standpoint for studying community 
life—and especially the matters of morality, regula-
tion, and religion. As a result, the contrasts between 
Durkheim’s (1883-1884) lectures and the statement 
on morality that he developed in 1887 following his 
(1885-1886) study leave in Germany are particular-
ly striking. Still, the sources of Durkheim’s ideas, 
along with the nature of their influence, have be-
come a point of controversy.6
Drawing on Durkheim’s 1887 paper, I will indicate 
his profound indebtedness to some German realists 
of whom Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) is particularly 
consequential.7 Indeed, Wundt and the German so-
cial realists Durkheim discusses seem foundation-
al for Durkheim’s (a) subsequent emphasis on the 
collective consciousness, (b) insistence on the es-
sentiality of the group (as in language, interaction, 
concepts, and meaning) for all realms of human 
6 Had Durkheim (1993 [1887]) explicitly defined German social 
realism as but a variant of the pragmatist philosophy associated 
with Plato and (especially) Aristotle, he might have had received 
a more tolerant reception in the French academic community. 
7 I developed a much stronger appreciation of the impact of 
Wilhelm Wundt’s analysis of morality on Durkheim’s subse-
quent scholarship from directly examining Wundt’s three vol-
ume Ethics. Indeed, there is much of fundamental sociologi-
cal value to be gleaned from a more sustained examination of 
Wundt’s Ethics.
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knowing, acting, and interchange, (c) the notably 
relativist, pluralist humanist/pragmatist features of 
his subsequent sociological analyses, and (d) atten-
tiveness to the developmental-historical flows—con-
tinuities and disjunctures—of community life.
In contrast to the position taken in the present state-
ment, Steven Lukes (1973: especially 79-95) seems in-
tent on minimizing the significance of Durkheim’s 
contacts with the German social realists. Whereas 
Lukes generally distances Durkheim from a prag-
matist viewpoint, Lukes partially may be respond-
ing to some comments Durkheim made in 1907.8 Oth-
ers, including Simon Deploige (1911), Pascal Gisbert 
(1959), Jeffrey Alexander (1986), Stjepan Mestrovic 
(1991), Robert Hall (1993), Robert Alun Jones (1994; 
1999), and Mustafa Emirbayer (1996a; 1996b), would 
not concur with Lukes on this matter.9 Readers may 
8 In 1907, and seemingly responding to more public (published) 
allegations that his sociology was very much a restatement of 
German social thought rather than having been derived from 
French sources, Durkheim would say that the major sources for 
his ideas were Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer, and (Spencer’s 
student) Alfred Espinas (see: Lukes 1973:79-85). Whereas this 
claim generally seems much more appropriate for Durkheim’s 
earlier works (1947 [1893]; 1951 [1897]; 1958 [1895]) than for his 
later scholarship, it notably disregards the interpretivist/prag-
matist materials that Durkheim introduced in his 1890s texts. 
Claims of these sorts also understate the interpretivist-positiv-
ist tensions that Durkheim seems likely to have experienced 
in developing these three texts. Also see Alexander (1986), 
Emirbayer (1996a; 1996b), and Jones (1999). Durkheim’s con-
ceptual continuities with German social realism become more 
apparent when one examines his 1902-1903, 1904-1905, 1912, 
1913-1914 texts in the light of his 1887 statement.
9 Part of the failure of Steven Lukes (1973), Marcel Fournier 
(2013), and numerous other commentators to acknowledge the 
pragmatist features of Durkheim’s work, as well as the connec-
tions of Durkheim with Wilhelm Wundt not only suggests a lack 
of awareness of Aristotle’s pragmatism (Prus 2007a; 2008; 2013a; 
2015) but also more direct familiarity with Wundt’s Ethics—the 
primary source on which Durkheim built in his 1887 article. 
Still, given the many areas of social life in which Durkheim 
addressed during his life-time and the many statements he de-
veloped (published texts and articles, lectures, notes, correspon-
dence), as well as the differing backgrounds and resources with 
which particular commentators have worked, significant diver-
sity of emphases and interpretation seems inevitable.
judge these viewpoints for themselves when they 
examine Durkheim’s fuller (1993 [1887]) text or the 
synopsis provided in the present statement.
Although Durkheim addresses the works of some 
German political economists, legalists, historians, 
and philosophers who adapt a realist (essentially 
pragmatist) perspective with an emphasis on “what 
is” and “how things are accomplished,” those who 
examine Durkheim’s “La Science Positive de la Mo-
rale en Allemagne” may be surprised to see the 
particular prominence Durkheim gives to Wilhelm 
Wundt’s Ethics (1914 [1886]).
Wilhelm Wundt may be only marginally known in 
sociological circles and then likely almost entirely 
as an experimental psychologist rather than a “folk 
psychologist.” However, Durkheim’s portrayal of 
Wundt’s Ethics makes it clear that Wundt (in devel-
oping his historically informed comparative analy-
sis of morality) has defined much of the agenda that 
Durkheim intends to follow over his career. Indeed, 
on the basis of Durkheim’s commentary and a full-
er examination of Wundt’s text, one might very well 
include Wilhelm Wundt, the psychologist turned phi-
losopher, historian, and analyst of community life, 
among “the founding fathers of sociology.”
Still, as Durkheim indicates in his 1887 paper, Wun-
dt was not alone in stressing the irreducible nature 
of the human group and the importance of attend-
ing to human activity, linguistic interchange, and 
the historical, developmental flows of human group 
life. Notably, thus, Durkheim describes this as a vis-
ible element of the German intellectual climate of 
the day. 
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Although very much overshadowed by the philos-
ophies of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), as well as 
the moralism of Karl Marx (1818-1893), there is 
a long-standing linguistic, philosophic, “folk psy-
chology” (die Völkerpsychologie) or social realist tra-
dition in German social thought. Not only have 
these scholars stridently criticized Kant and Hegel 
for their failure to attend to language as an essen-
tial enabling baseline element in all human thought 
and reasoning practices (i.e., for failing to acknowl-
edge the intersubjectively accomplished nature of 
all human knowing and acting) but these scholars 
also challenged positivist conceptions of the human 
condition and the scientistic rejection of historical 
and philosophical materials from the past.
In addition to the social realists that Durkheim dis-
cusses in his 1887 paper, this would include J. G. Ha-
mann (1730-1788), G. Chr. Lichtenberg (1742-1799), Jo-
hann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), Wilhelm Humboldt 
(1767-1835), Otto Friedrich Gruppe (1804-1876), Conrad 
Hermann (1819-1897), Gustav Gerber (1820-1901), and 
Friedrich Max Muller (1823-1900). Herman Cloeren 
(1988) provides a very insightful review of the works 
of these scholars. As indicated in Prus (1996), scholars 
centrally involved in related scholarly (pragmatist-re-
lated) developments would include Wilhelm Dilthey 
(1833-1911) and Georg Simmel (1858-1818).10
It should be noted as well that the social realism 
Durkheim discusses in his 1887 paper did not origi-
10 Following his 1887 statement, Emile Durkheim would become 
well-aware of the academic risks of pursuing ideas associated 
with German social thought in France. Still, German social realism 
would further recede into the background with World War I and 
the subsequent increased scholarly attentiveness to a materialist, 
structurally-oriented scientific sociology in the ensuing decades. 
nate in Germany but, as Cloeren (1988) observes, more 
centrally reflects the contributions of some British 
(pragmatist-oriented) scholars. This includes Francis 
Bacon (1561-1626), John Locke (1632-1704), and David 
Hume (1711-1776). Still, as with the German social re-
alists, we may acknowledge a more extended (albeit 
often notably indirect) indebtedness of both these Brit-
ish and German scholars to Aristotle (particularly his 
Nicomachean Ethics; also see Prus 2004; 2007a; 2008).
In his comparatively short but still intense, concep-
tually compacted 1887 statement, Durkheim not 
only emphasizes Wundt’s contributions to the study 
of human group life but also acknowledges a set of 
somewhat parallel viewpoints articulated by some 
German economists, legalists, and historians that 
discuss the social order of community life in hu-
manly engaged, developmentally sustained terms. 
Pragmatist emphases pertaining to the nature of 
human group life and the relationship of the indi-
vidual to society are prominent in Durkheim’s later 
(1915 [1912]; 1961 [1902-1903]; 1977 [1904-1905]; 1983 
[1913-1914]) works.11 However, the conceptual-an-
alytic materials that can be gleaned from Emile 
11 Albeit considerably less evident, amidst the continuities of 
Durkheim’s earlier exposure to French structuralism and posi-
tivist social thought, some noteworthy pragmatist motifs can be 
found in Durkheim’s Division of Labor. Likewise, important fea-
tures of Rules clearly reflect a pragmatist orientation to the study 
of human group life. By contrast, Durkheim’s Suicide, which is 
often (mis)taken as Durkheim’s “definitive methodological pro-
totype,” has very little to offer to the pragmatist study of hu-
man lived experience—including suicide as a socially engaged 
process embedded in the context of ongoing community life. 
While appealing to “the remedial social problems mentality” 
of his time and corresponding searches for “structuralist factors 
and quick-fix solutions” of our own time, it is not apparent that 
Durkheim was conceptually or methodologically enchanted 
with Suicide. Still, Emile Durkheim had made long-term com-
mitments to this project and, despite its substantial conceptual 
and methodological failings, he envisioned Suicide as a publica-
tion of considerable importance for his career.
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Durkheim’s “The Scientific Study of Morality in 
Germany” constitute an “intellectual sociological 
treasure chest” in themselves.
Whereas readers may be struck by the extended, 
pronounced emphasis on the collective conscious-
ness of the group that Durkheim discusses in his 
1887 publication, this statement also represents a di-
rect critique of Platonist, Cartesian, and Kantian ra-
tionalism. Moreover, Durkheim explicitly challeng-
es the viability of utilitarianism and individualism 
as overarching rationalities for explaining the moral 
order of the community. 
For the German social realists, the interaction that 
takes place in the community is central for enabling 
all that is humanly known and meaningfully en-
gaged. Moreover, there is a sustained pragmatist 
emphasis on activity. The group achieves its viability 
as people do things and relate to others in linguis-
tically-enabled, minded, and socially acknowledged 
purposive terms. Still, and no less consequentially, 
people’s conceptions of knowing and acting (and the 
resources accumulated therein) not only are collec-
tively developed, sustained, and transformed over 
time but these “cultural accomplishments” also are 
very much one with the viewpoints, activities, and 
interchanges that constitute ongoing community life.
Accordingly, Durkheim (1993 [1887]) stresses (a) an 
attentiveness to the historical-developmental flows 
of human group life for comprehending the culture 
(as in traditions, knowledge, morality, and day-to-
day practices) of the community and (b) the relativi-
ty of morality across societies, as well as within par-
ticular communities over time. Emile Durkheim also 
acknowledges (c) the problematic nature of commu-
nity life—viewing emergence as an indefinite, on-
going socially engaged process that transcends the 
interests and viewpoints of particular individuals. 
As well, (d) insofar as it is seen to epitomize the col-
lective, reflective, enacted features of community—
as a societal force or collective spirit that transcends 
the individuals within the community—morality is 
to be seen as a socially achieved process. It is for this 
reason that both religious and secular viewpoints 
and practices are to be given particular attention in 
developing a scholarly analysis of the moral order-
ing of community life.
Contending that (e) ongoing community life, rather 
than the physiological or psychological qualities of 
individuals, is the centering point of analysis for hu-
man knowing, activity, and interchange, Durkheim 
addresses (f) the importance of both meaningful, 
intentioned, and more collectively routinized activ-
ities and modes of association for the study of com-
munity life. Relatedly, he remains attentive to (g) the 
developmental, enacted interrelatedness and the as-
sociated resiliencies of the many humanly engaged 
theaters of operation that transcend more individu-
alized, as well as more extended collective efforts to 
change aspects of community life. 
Methodologically, Durkheim emphasizes (h) the 
importance of studying the developmental flows of 
community life, as well as (i) the necessity of attend-
ing to the instances and ways in which people engage 
and interact within the many organizational contexts 
of community life and (j) the importance of pursuing 
sustained comparative analysis (analytic induction 
rather than deductive logic) of developmental his-
Robert Prus 
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torical and ethnological materials for (k) the purpose 
of discerning, identifying, and articulating the more 
fundamental (versus more transitory) viewpoints, 
practices, and processes of human group life.
“La Science Positive de la Morale en 
Allemagne” 
[Note: The page references are to the English trans-
lation of “La Science Positive de la Morale en Alle-
magne”—“The Scientific Study of Morality in Ger-
many” that appears in Robert Hall’s (1993) Ethics and 
the Sociology of Morals [E&SM]. To maintain the over-
all flow and coherence of Durkheim’s statement, 
as well as enable readers to refer to Durkheim’s 
text (and Hall’s translation) for greater detail, I will 
be presenting this synopsis in the order in which 
Durkheim developed his statement, dealing in turn 
with each author that he considers.] 
Durkheim begins his 1887 “The Scientific Study of 
Morality in Germany” (E&SM:58) by observing that 
French approaches to ethics can be characterized as 
either (a) idealist (presuming pre-existing or invari-
ant truths) or (b) utilitarian (denoting variants of 
self/unit-serving rationalist principles) in emphasis. 
However, Durkheim observes, some German schol-
ars have taken a different approach. This latter (social 
realist) approach, Durkheim contends, is extremely 
important for it provides a framework for studying 
ethics in more distinctively scientific terms.
Part I: Economists and Sociologists 
Opening his discussion by considering the relation-
ship of ethics to economics, Durkheim (E&SM:58-
62) says that economists typically have approached 
the linkages of ethics and economics in three ways. 
First, some view ethics as subsumed by, or as the 
emergent byproduct of, economic concerns with 
utility. Second, some see ethics and economics as ex-
isting as independent but essentially parallel devel-
opments, with all essential moral truths correspond-
ing to economic truths. Third, there are those who 
seek correlations between particular economic con-
ditions and specific moral viewpoints. Durkheim 
takes issue with each of these in turn. Thus, while 
contending that ethics and economics are distinct 
realms of activity in many respects, he stresses the 
developmental, humanly engaged interdependence of the 
two sets of endeavors.
In developing a fuller alternative to these first 
three views of economics and ethics, Durkheim 
(E&SM:62-68) draws on the German political econ-
omists Adolph Wagner (1835-1917) and Gustav von 
Schmoller (1838-1917). Both challenge the utilitarian 
position that society exists to serve the interests of 
the individuals within. Invoking expressions such 
as “social conscience,” “the collective spirit,” and 
the like [which Durkheim describes as a current 
analytic emphasis in Germany], these two political 
economists argue that society is much more than 
the sum of its parts and is to be understood as a gen-
uine unity unto itself. 
Relatedly, all aspects of the economy, including the 
private economy, are to be seen as within the con-
text of the collectivity. The economy, thus, is a social 
economy and can only be understood with respect 
to the particular community in which it functions 
and takes its shape. In contrast to those adapting 
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notions of self-serving utilitarianism, Wagner and 
Schmoller contend that the realms of both econo-
my and ethics incorporate elements of unselfish-
ness and are mindful of differences between things 
“done for the good of the state” and “those pursued 
because of individual interests.” 
As well, since morality and economics are interfused 
in a great many realms of community life, it is nec-
essary to comprehend some fundamental economic 
processes to understand community morality. Like-
wise, whereas economics represents only one arena 
in which matters of ethics may be invoked, econom-
ics is shaped by people’s concerns with ethics, as 
well as the interests of particular individuals.
Then, after stating that the purpose of political econ-
omy is to explain the economic functioning of the 
(broader) social organism in which it is embedded, 
Durkheim (E&SM:66-67) says that economic phe-
nomena, like all other matters of community life, 
are to be approached as developmental social processes.
Drawing directly on Schmoller, Durkheim explains 
that as people begin to do things more consistently, 
those practices “begin to impose themselves on the 
participants” as habits. As they reach this stage, rou-
tinized practices assume more restrictive, compulso-
ry, or obligatory qualities and, thereby, provide the 
foundations for mores and, subsequently, law and 
morality. People’s economic activities also become 
crystallized in this fashion. Thus, amidst the changes 
and adjustments that take place over time, economic 
practices also become moral phenomena as people 
begin to establish particular ways of “doing business” 
and envision these as more entirely appropriate.
In contrast to those who treat economics and moral-
ity as if they were two separate worlds, Durkheim 
not only insists on the importance of attending to 
ways that economic practices enter into certain as-
pects of the moral order (e.g., property, contracts) 
but he also encourages analysts to be mindful of 
the ways in which people’s broader notions of 
morality become infused with their economic ar-
rangements.
Elaborating further on Wagner’s work, Durkheim 
(E&SM:68-70) says that notions of individual liberty, 
ownership, and the like have no value or meaning 
in themselves. It is only within the context of the 
community that matters of these sorts assume any 
consequence.
Likewise, Durkheim says, it is inappropriate to start 
with some abstract principle of morality and pro-
ceed to deduce applications from this. Instead, fol-
lowing Schmoller, Durkheim insists that in order to 
comprehend the forms or principles of morality, it is 
necessary to observe people’s actual practices and de-
velop inferences from these instances.12 Moreover, 
Durkheim states, morality would have no relevance 
as a detached, abstract concept. Notions of morality 
are meaningful only when these are linked to life in 
more direct, actively engaged terms.
12 Durkheim makes no reference to Aristotle here. However, 
Aristotle contends that concepts (also forms, abstractions, gen-
erals) are derived from a comparative analysis of the instanc-
es in which things take place. Plato is not entirely consistent 
in his attentiveness to forms (and concepts). Thus, whereas 
Plato is highly attentive to the humanly, community-enabled, 
constructed nature of knowing, acting, and interchange in ex-
tended sectors of his texts (especially Republic and Laws; also 
see Prus 2009a; 2011a; 2011b; 2013b; Prus and Camara 2010), he 
sometimes addresses forms and concepts as pre-existing mat-
ters. Aristotle clearly does not accept this latter position.
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Viewing ethics as a “science of life,” Durkheim 
(E&SM:70-73) stresses the point that it is humanity, 
actual lived humanity, as opposed to abstract princi-
ples, that is the subject matter of the study of ethics.
Then, addressing a related question of whether 
humans can effectively intervene in basic econom-
ic processes (which, Durkheim notes, are seen as 
immutable by the Manchester School), Durkheim 
takes the viewpoint that the economy has a broad-
er social quality than the Manchester School rec-
ognizes. Still, Durkheim contends, these processes 
cannot simply be adjusted by people’s intentions 
or by invoking particular instances of legislation 
as Wagner has suggested. Although economic pro-
cesses do change, sometimes comparatively quick-
ly, Durkheim says, social facts are complex, diffuse 
matters and cannot be adequately comprehended 
(and regulated) by human minds. It is this multiplis-
tic set of processes and the lack of an overarching 
rationality that not only obscures scholarly analysis 
but that also frustrates policy interventions.
Durkheim (E&SM:73-76) then references the econo-
mist Albert Schaffle whose works shed more light on 
morality as a social process. Rather than viewing mo-
rality as a system of rules, Schaffle argues that morali-
ty represents a dynamic social function. Not only does 
morality take shape through a historically articulated 
collective process but the morality of the community 
also “adjusts” to the conditions of the collectivity. 
Thus, in contrast to Wagner’s assumption that mo-
rality can be intentionally adjusted through legisla-
tion, Schaffle views rules and policies more entirely 
as adjustive responses to collectively experienced 
circumstances. Likewise, because of the emergent 
nature of public sentiments, transformations in mo-
rality cannot be predicted with much accuracy.
Still, despite his skepticism about invoking chang-
es from the outside (as in imposing legislation on 
morality as the academic socialists Wagner and 
Schmoller have suggested), Schaffle argues for 
changes that develop from self-reflective, deliberate 
activities taking place within the institutions that 
constitute society.
Although accepting Schaffle’s views about the lim-
ited effects of legislation on morality and that leg-
islation reflects acknowledgements of changes to 
generally existing practices, Durkheim says that he 
is skeptical of Schaffle’s claims that change within 
occurs because of direct, reflective, purposive be-
havior. In particular, Durkheim is reluctant to ac-
knowledge the family as the central source of this 
artistic (architectural) morality and Schaffle’s asso-
ciated tendency to envision the family in more psy-
chological terms.
Durkheim concludes this section of his text by ob-
serving that philosophy has undergone a major trans-
formation in Germany. Whereas psychology with its 
linkages to physiology has largely broken away from 
philosophy, so also does the study of morality in Ger-
many (thusly transformed by the economists) seem 
on its way to becoming a field of study on its own.
Part II: The Jurists, Rudolph Jhering
Continuing with this highly compacted set of es-
says on morality as a humanly engaged process, 
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Durkheim (E&SM:78-88) next addresses the work of 
an Austrian legalist Georg Jellinek (1851-1911) and 
a German law professor Rudolf von Jhering (1818-
1892). Both approach the study of law in more dis-
tinctive, purposive, processual terms. Although 
focusing more exclusively on Jhering, Durkheim 
is quick to point out that the scientific-enacted ap-
proach of Jellinek, Jhering, and some others work-
ing in Germany stands in stark contrast to French 
perspectives on the philosophy of law.
In developing this statement, Durkheim (E&SM:79-
80) notes that Jhering invites inquiry into the nature 
of law from a variety of analytic viewpoints. This 
includes linguistic analysis, mythology, etymolo-
gy, pedagogy, and an empirical historical mode of 
inquiry wherein law is examined dispassionately. 
Jhering’s emphasis is on comprehending law in the 
same way that one would study other natural phe-
nomena.
After observing that philosophers since the time 
of Plato have routinely reduced reality to abstract-
ed, logically connected sets of ideas, Durkheim 
(E&SM:80) says that by doing so, they miss the essen-
tial motivational elements of life. To live, Durkheim 
insists, people do not merely think, they act. And, 
it is with a purpose in mind that people give action 
a direction. Action is to be understood by reference 
to its purpose. It is this emphasis on people pursu-
ing ends or objectives, Durkheim points out, that 
characterizes Jhering’s position.13
13 Those familiar with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Poetics, 
and Rhetoric will recognize that the purposive, interconnect-
ed, and adjustive qualities of human activity and interchange 
(denoting matters of intention, reflectivity, deliberation, plan-
ning, implementation, and adjustment) are central features of 
Still, Durkheim (E&SM:81-82) adds, because in-
stances of human behavior are bound up in the 
historical flows and developmental culture of the 
human community, people often are unable to ap-
preciate the relevance or meanings of their behav-
iors in these broader terms and, relatedly, readily fit 
into these flows. As a result, people do not always 
act mindfully of the broader, more established pur-
poses that these behaviors imply. For this reason, 
Durkheim states, it is important to go beyond Jhe-
ring and study the more general social contexts in 
which people act. Thus, whereas people may act in 
accordance with particular aspects of the law, they 
need not be mindful of the purposes of those spe-
cific aspects of the law when these regulations were 
earlier established [Durkheim addresses this point 
in more detail later in discussing Wundt’s Ethics].
Then, returning more directly to Jhering’s work, 
Durkheim (E&SM:82) says that law is developed to 
insure the existence of society. Still, acknowledging 
the relativity of community morality, Durkheim stress-
es the notably different versions of the law that may 
be invoked in this and that society even as the law-
makers address fundamental features of social life. 
The laws of particular communities need not cover 
all aspects of community life but, following Jhering, 
Durkheim (E&SM:83-84) stresses the relevance of 
the law for wide ranges of individual rights. Still, 
whereas individual rights vary across communities, 
community conceptions of individual rights also 
Aristotle’s pragmatism. However, here, as in other places in 
his 1887 text, Durkheim remains more entirely focused on the 
German scholars who work with these notions rather than ac-
knowledging their intellectual indebtedness to Aristotle’s ap-
proach to the study of human knowing and acting.
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bring with them increased levels of responsibility 
and obligation.
The “natural law” theorists (presumably referring to 
Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel 
Kant, and John Stuart Mill), Durkheim (E&SM:84-
85) says, fail to comprehend the actual nature of the 
human community—that societies are not simply 
masses of individuals and social order cannot be re-
duced to matters of individual interests.
Having thusly dealt with “the purpose of the law,” 
Durkheim (E&SM:85-86) next considers how the 
law is realized. The law, he says, is achieved by re-
straint. However, there are wide ranges of restraint. 
Relatedly, force and the impending sanctions are 
not sufficient in themselves for comprehending peo-
ple’s compliance with the law.
For society to be possible, Durkheim (E&SM:86-87) 
emphasizes, it also is necessary that people have an 
unselfish appreciation of the law as signified by the 
matters of “love for the law” and “a sense of duty.” 
These elements, Durkheim adds, are central to Jher-
ing’s broader theory of morality.
Whereas morality serves the same basic purpose as 
the law, that of sustaining social order, morality dif-
fers from law. While it is authority of the state that 
provides the basis for the continuity and enforce-
ment of law, morality is the product of the entire 
society. Thus, Durkheim (E&SM:86-87) stresses, no 
one, regardless of one’s position in the community, 
is immune from moral constraint. Likewise, morali-
ty has a pervasive quality that permeates every fea-
ture of human group life. Consequently, although 
morality lacks the (focused, authoritative) force of 
law and does not address the essential features of 
community existence in the same way, morality ex-
tends far beyond the law in regulating community 
life.
After observing that Jhering has examined morality 
in extended analytic detail with respect to language, 
mores, and customs, Durkheim (E&SM:87-88) says 
that although Jhering (like jurists more generally) 
still gives too much attention to calculated self in-
terest and external matters, he is to be commended 
not only for (a) his work on the scientific study of 
morality and (b) his attempts to integrate the philos-
ophy of law with the positive (enacted, actual) law, 
but also (c) for integrating the study of custom into 
the broader field of ethics. Having established these 
baseline positions, Durkheim says that he will next 
deal with Wilhelm Wundt’s work.
Part III: The Moral Philosophers: Wilhelm Wundt
[Whereas Emile Durkheim is to be commended for 
his astute, comprehensive, and highly succinct ren-
dering of the uniquely enabling sociological quality of 
Wilhelm Wundt’s Ethics, readers may easily under-
estimate Durkheim’s appreciation of Wundt’s analy-
sis of community life. Still, while centrally grasping 
the pragmatist sociological potency of Wundt’s work 
in ways others have completely missed, Durkheim’s 
representations gloss over some of the more extend-
ed sets of insights and qualifications that Wundt 
(1914 [1886]) develops in Ethics. As a result, it is easy 
to lose sight of Wundt’s more substantial contribu-
tions to sociology—even as Durkheim emphasizes 
the centrality of Wundt’s analysis for the study of 
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morality. Whereas Durkheim rarely mentions Wil-
helm Wundt, the German scholar to whom he is 
so indebted, in his subsequent pragmatist-oriented 
works (1915 [1912]; 1961 [1902-1903]; 1977 [1904-1905]; 
1983 [1913-1914]), it is instructive to keep in mind 
that, following his studies in Germany, Durkheim 
had been criticized by French colleagues (of whom 
Simon Deploige seems particularly persistent) for 
being overly attentive to German social thought.]
After observing that that the authors he has discussed 
so far were moral philosophers in a more marginal 
sense, Durkheim (E&SM:89) says that it is Wilhelm 
Wundt (1832-1920) who has synthesized the works of 
the other German moral theorists into a more coher-
ent, focused process-oriented study of ethics.
Defining Wundt’s (observational, historical, com-
parative analytic) approach as distinctively empiri-
cal, Durkheim (E&SM:90-92) says that Wundt insists 
that reason alone is insufficient to comprehend eth-
ics and that, as with other subject matters, the study 
of ethics must be grounded in observation. Thus, in 
contrast to considerations of ideals, motives, inten-
tions, and consequences, Wundt emphasizes the 
necessity of focusing on practical action—the things 
people actually do. Relatedly, whereas the goal of 
ethics is discern the general principles which the 
instances represent, this is to be accomplished 
through an examination of the instances in which 
people act. In these respects, Durkheim explicitly 
points out, Wundt approaches ethics in a fairly con-
ventional scientific manner. 
Still, Wundt adds another highly consequential el-
ement to the study of ethics. To achieve a more ad-
equate comprehension of ethics, Wundt says that it 
is necessary also to embark on a comparative exam-
ination of the different moral viewpoints that people 
have developed throughout recorded history. Thus, 
while people may have certain psychological capac-
ities or dispositions, it is necessary to move past invalid 
tendencies to reduce morality to psychological properties 
or individual dispositions.
According to Wundt (E&SM:92) it is only by study-
ing collective matters as instances of social psychol-
ogy (die Völkerpsychologie) that one can hope to un-
derstand ethics. Because ethics is a social, historical-
ly achieved phenomenon, it is to be studied as a col-
lective process. As well, individual consciousness 
(as in people’s thoughts, concepts, and notions of in-
dividuality) is to be understood as emerging within 
the interchanges of group life—not as people with soli-
tary-enabled realms of consciousness producing the 
concepts that inform and shape human group life. 
The study of ethics, thus, becomes the history of com-
munity life—language, religion, customs, culture, 
activities and interchanges, restraint, freedoms and 
regulation, including people’s experiences with 
the physical environment. Still, of these processes, 
Durkheim says, it is religion and customs that merit 
most sustained attention.
Durkheim (E&SM:92-95) begins his discussion of 
religion by noting that it is impossible to differen-
tiate the roots and early developments of religion 
and morality, adding that the distinctions emerged 
only over time. Continuing to draw directly on 
Wundt, Durkheim says that early group life consist-
ed of vague mixes of ideas and practices and that 
Robert Prus 
Qualitative Sociology Review • www.qualitativesociologyreview.org 19
it is because of these more obscure and fortuitous 
combinations of things that the study of religion in 
primitive societies is so problematic. Accordingly, it 
is only in using the more distinct notions of religion 
and morality that have emerged among more civi-
lized societies that one may have a basis for delin-
eating the roots of religious ideas in more primitive 
communities.14
Approaching things in this more comparative sense, 
Wundt says that all viewpoints and representations 
of things that reflect human ideals may be consid-
ered religious [sacred?] in essence. Stating that peo-
ple have a need for reference points, Wundt says 
that morality, like religion, not only is expressed 
as ideals but also readily becomes personified (i.e., 
objectified and sanctified through particular people 
and other things). Thus, whereas primitive peoples 
may have revered ancestors in cult-like fashions, 
envisioned natural objects and physical forces as 
deities, and later developed other notions of divini-
ty, human ideals have been epitomized, supported, 
and sanctified in human expressions of religion. 
However, Durkheim adds, for the separation of mo-
rality from religion something more was required, 
the development of custom.
Still following Wundt closely, Durkheim (E&SM:95-
97) says that although some theorists have argued 
14 Interestingly, this is one place that Durkheim will later (see: 
Durkheim’s [1915 <1912>] The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life) break away from Wilhelm Wundt. Thus, Durkheim will 
make the case for the importance of studying the fundamental 
features of primitive religions over the (seemingly more com-
plex) major religions. While I have found so much of value in 
Wundt’s work, I concur with Durkheim on this point—not to 
disregard more complex variants of some category of phenom-
ena but to try to establish the most basic or foundational fea-
tures of any particular realm of human interchange.
that custom emerges as the product of individual 
practices, it is mistaken to think that custom, like 
language and religion, is somehow the product of 
individual consciousness. Indeed, although custom 
and other collective matters presume human capac-
ities for consciousness, individual consciousness is the 
product of group consciousness. 
Thus, insofar as humans linguistically participate 
in “the consciousness of the community,” they be-
come the recipients and beneficiaries (of viewpoints, 
practices, stocks of knowledge, and technologies) 
of the more enduring community life-worlds in 
which they find themselves. Still, even though it 
is people who sustain the prevailing practices and 
viewpoints of their own times, as individuals they 
typically have little direct, especially longer-term, 
influence on the overall collective life of the com-
munity.
As instances of collectively achieved group life, 
particular customs are to be explained through 
earlier collective practices and interchange. Fur-
ther, although the bases on which specific customs 
emerged may long have disappeared from memory, 
these practices persist as phenomena carried for-
ward in the culture of community life. Likewise, 
in tracing customs back over time, one only finds 
other collective phenomena in the form of customs, 
beliefs, and religious practices.
Referencing Wundt again, Durkheim (E&SM:96-98) 
directly opposes those (probably referring to Hobbes 
and Rousseau) who contend that customs are the 
products of individual interests and that these only 
subsequently had been sanctified by religion.
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By contrast, Durkheim says, customs are derived from 
religion rather than from configurations of individu-
al interests and that it is these (religious) ideals and 
the superior powers that religion represents that 
enable things to become established as customs. It 
is religion that binds people together. It is religion 
that generates an altruism or concern with the other 
that extends beyond the individual. As well, even 
when particular customs lose more direct connec-
tions with religion, they still maintain some of this 
altruistic base of support.
It is for this reason too, Durkheim adds, that law and 
morality remain largely undifferentiated among less 
civilized peoples. Likewise, whereas customs and 
morality are essentially synonymous among primi-
tive peoples, more civilized societies judge customs 
from moral standpoints.
Durkheim (E&SM:98-102) next addresses morality 
in more focused terms. After affirming the point 
that customs had their origins in religious practic-
es, Durkheim says that, in addition to people’s reli-
gious practices, those who constituted early society 
were drawn together not by blood relationships but 
by commonalities of language, habits, and manners. 
Further, the first societies would have consisted of 
more ambiguous collectivities with concepts of fam-
ilies and other specialized divisions only emerging 
later on.
As well, Durkheim stresses, people’s natural affin-
ities with those who are similar to themselves are 
not the products of egoism (or the pursuit of people’s 
own interests). Instead, it represents an autonomous 
tendency of great consequence for the social order 
of the community. Indeed, all altruistic tendencies, 
as well as the very foundations on which all matters 
of morality are founded are based on (a) people’s ca-
pacities to experience sympathetic affinities with oth-
ers, and (b) the respect that people assign to religious 
ideals and practices—and the associated sense of 
the subjugation of the self to something greater than 
oneself. 
Then, after asserting that these tendencies towards 
altruism are not products of egoist or self-serving 
inclinations as some have contended, Durkheim still 
acknowledges the powerful self-serving tendencies 
that people develop with respect to themselves, as 
well as people’s capacities for developing personal 
satisfactions from helping others. 
Although these latter sets of egoistic tendencies may 
seem to cancel out more genuine altruistic tenden-
cies, Durkheim insists that altruism is not a dis-
guised form of egoism. It is inappropriate to try to 
explain things (altruism) as functions of their oppo-
sites (egoism). Something more is needed.
Also, as Durkheim reminds readers, the natural 
moral practices of the community do not reflect 
some longer-term calculations or reasoned objec-
tives but emerge as part of a broader, more nebu-
lous, adjustive process that assumes a reality well 
beyond people’s intentions.
Commenting next on the matters of homogeneity 
and division with respect to people’s notions of mo-
rality, Durkheim (E&SM:100-102) says that the first 
societies would have been characterized by a sin-
gle morality. However, people’s notions of morali-
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ty would become increasingly diversified as various 
groups and categories of people become more dis-
tinct within. With an increase in the size of the com-
munity as well, morality also becomes more deper-
sonalized (and presumably more autonomous).
In the process, Durkheim says, people’s affinities 
with more particular sets of others become replaced 
with more general but still strong attachments to as-
pects of the broader community (e.g., art, customs, 
science) in which they are embedded—and thus ex-
perience through a mutuality of participation. It is 
here, Durkheim states, through participation in the 
collective consciousness, that people experience the 
ideals of the community in more impersonal but 
still compelling terms.15
Elaborating on the tendency towards abstraction of 
the ideals represented by the collective conscious-
ness, Durkheim says that it is on this basis that peo-
ple routinely transcend differences within their own 
communities. Further, because the more imperson-
alized abstractions of the collective consciousness 
lend themselves to applications that are unbound-
ed by time and space, people also may begin to ar-
ticulate moralities that encompass humanity in its 
entirety. Still, he comments, the civilizing process 
commonly entails other divisions and imbalances, 
which contradict these broader moral dispositions. 
Mindful of these moral disjunctures and expressing 
some optimism for pursuing a more viable morality 
15 Unless they have been exposed to other well-articulated 
moral orders, individuals would have little basis on which to 
contest or even knowingly consider contesting the realism of the 
collective consciousness from whence they have derived all 
notions of “what is” and “what is not.”
for all, Durkheim says he will next proceed to sum-
marize Wundt’s history of moral ideas. [It should be 
noted that whereas Wundt traces the development of 
ethics from the classical Greek era to his own time in 
extended detail, Durkheim concentrates primarily 
on the more major sets of definitions and principles 
that Wundt offers. As a result, much of the scholarly 
value of Wundt’s Ethics is lost. Still, Durkheim’s syn-
opsis of Wundt’s text is valuable, not only for its ex-
ceptional attentiveness to human group life but also 
for enabling readers to better comprehend central 
aspects of Durkheim’s sociology.]
Following Wundt along, Durkheim (E&SM:102) says 
that the formal elements of morality are expressed by 
the contrary notions of approval and disapproval 
(i.e., good and evil), wherein moral approval is as-
sociated with things fostering long-term, especial-
ly sanctified notions of satisfaction. The material or 
foundational qualities of morality reside in basic hu-
man capacities for sympathy and respect. Whereas 
sympathy is derived from the affinities associated 
with people’s participation in human affairs, respect 
is the product of religious beliefs.
In discussing “the general laws of moral evolution,” 
Durkheim (E&SM:103-105) first addresses (Wundt’s) 
law of the three stages, saying that moral life moves 
from (a) a comparatively vague, but generally homo-
geneous state to (b) a more extensively differentiat-
ed state, followed by (c) a pattern of synthesis and 
concentration.
Still, Durkheim centrally emphasizes Wundt’s law of 
heterogeneity of ends. At the core of this principle are 
the ideas that (1) even when people act voluntarily 
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with particular ends in mind, their actions may gen-
erate consequences beyond any that they intended 
and (2) when people attend to these other effects and 
find these relevant in some way, they may begin to 
engage in the same activities, but now with these 
other effects in mind—thereby generating other ob-
jectives, motives, or purposes for the same acts; and 
(3) this process can continue indefinitely and takes 
people into increasingly extended realms of activi-
ty, meaning, and purpose. Relatedly, (4) because of 
this evolutionary (adjustive) process, people may 
subsequently engage in particular activities for very 
different reasons than those prompting the same 
behaviors at earlier points in time. Their activities 
(also meanings and purposes) also assume an emer-
gent, unpredictable quality that goes well beyond 
any intentional or purposive ends or objectives.
Further, because of this set of processes, Durkheim 
continues, it is to be recognized that theory cannot 
be expected to match the emergent, unpredictable nature 
of humanly experienced reality. Because people cannot 
know the outcomes of their activities in this broader 
sense, the best they can do is anticipate the future in 
more general terms.
As a result, as well, deliberate thought and planning 
can assume only a small part in this evolutionary 
process for it is only after things have taken place 
and been experienced that people may define what 
has happened and judge their value as matters to be 
pursued further. Still, employing Wundt’s reason-
ing, Durkheim says that if morality is derived from 
religion, it is because people have defined the things 
that emerge in religious contexts as denoting better 
approximations of their moral ideals.
As well, whereas Darwin and Spencer have applied 
the concept of natural selection to (human) morality, 
Wundt is adamantly opposed to ideas of that sort. 
Indeed, Durkheim indicates, rather than view mo-
rality as the product of a struggle to survive, Wun-
dt emphasizes the point that morality functions to 
minimize disruption and promote social relations. 
Likewise, Durkheim observes, Wundt considers any 
idea that moral ideas can be (biologically) inherited 
to be preposterous.
Then, moving more centrally into volume III of 
Wundt’s Ethics, Durkheim (E&SM:106-108) provides 
a broader introduction to Wundt’s ethical principles 
before embarking on more focused considerations 
of ethical goals, motives, and norms. In contrast 
to the many theorists who strive to reduce ethical 
principles to individualistic impulses, Wundt states 
that ethical matters revolve around two centering 
points—individualism and universalism.
Noting that Wundt provides an extended refutation 
of the positions that Rousseau and other “theorists 
of individualism” assume, Durkheim (still following 
Wundt) says that just because all notions of individ-
ualism are rooted in (and are to be comprehended 
with respect to) the group this does not mean that 
notions of individualism cease or lose their vitality. 
However, rather than individuals being the founda-
tional base from which society is achieved Durkheim 
(with Wundt) stresses the point that only by slow de-
grees are people able to achieve a more extended sep-
aration of self from its group-based foundation.
Next, taking issue with universalists such as Hegel 
and Schopenhauer, Durkheim (with Wundt) says 
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that while people are so thoroughly indebted to so-
ciety, it is essential to recognize that people also act 
back on (resist/challenge/reject aspects of) the very 
communities in which they are situated. Indeed, 
there have been some people whose capacities to 
formulate and express the ideas of their societies 
and times were so great that they have served as 
a “form of living conscience” for their communities. 
As well, whereas most people may do nothing to 
alter their communities in any significant manner 
and instead largely perpetuate existing practices, it 
is important to acknowledge the changes that less 
prominent people may introduce in smaller seg-
ments of the community.
Concluding this broader introduction, Durkheim 
says that it is important for scholars dealing with mo-
rality to be attentive to the interconnections of groups 
and the individuals who constitute these groups.
Then, turning more directly to “ethical goals,” 
Durkheim (E&SM:108-111) begins to contrast Wun-
dt’s position with the Utilitarians and Rational-
ists who address ethics by arbitrarily prioritizing 
specific principles. Mindful of Wundt’s position, 
Durkheim says it is essential to observe the things 
that specific communities (as collectivities) consider 
to be moral and attempt to ascertain the foundation-
al emphases of these matters.
Following Wundt, Durkheim notes that the goals of 
people’s actions can be individual (as in attending 
to oneself and one’s more immediate associates), so-
cietal (community-oriented), or humanistic (in yet 
more generalized, encompassing terms). Still, there is 
nothing moral about doing things for oneself or even 
helping particular others in the community achieve 
their goals. Indeed, people’s goals assume a moral es-
sence only insofar as they are oriented towards oth-
ers in more impersonal, generalized terms.
It is on this basis that societies, as essences unto 
themselves, became more worthy targets of moral 
activities. Observing that individuals, as individu-
als, are essentially inconsequential in the broader 
historical developments and futures of the human 
community, it is societies as more fundamental and 
enduring essences that merit love and devotion. It is 
human goals in this broader sense, particularly those 
directed towards humanity in more extended terms, 
that epitomize the ideals of moral action. Even so, 
Durkheim (following Wundt) observes these ideals 
will never be realized since people become aware of 
how these objectives might be better achieved only as 
they have moved in newly emergent directions and 
have become aware of the greater potential awaiting 
them through their earlier activities.
Having defined moral goals in terms of an unending 
pursuit of universalistic human ideals, Durkheim 
(E&SM:111-113) next summarizes Wundt’s consider-
ation of “ethical motives.” Stating that every motive 
presupposes a feeling and some associated images, 
Wundt distinguishes three types of ethical motives. 
Whereas all motives are seen as products of the 
communities in which people know, value, and act, 
Wundt’s distinctions hinge on the amount and type of 
deliberation implied in different decisions to act. 
Thus, regardless of whether actions are directed to-
wards oneself or others, Wundt uses the term “mo-
tives of perception” to refer to cases in which things 
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seem so clear and direct that people react more habit-
ually or “without thinking.” When things are more 
ambiguous or involve dilemmas of sorts and entail 
some reflection or deliberation (involving action per-
taining to the self and/or the other), the term “motives 
of understanding” is applied. The third category of 
motives is yet more focused and revolves around the 
matter of pursuing activities in ways that are mind-
ful of the broader ideals of humanity. Thus, although 
emphasizing the point that the broader spirit of hu-
manity characterizes all moral motives, this latter 
“motive of reasoning” not only tends to be less com-
mon overall but assumes a nobler, reflective quality.
Observing that ethical goals are almost invari-
ably envisioned in obligatory terms, Durkheim 
(E&SM:113-115) next engages “ethical norms.” Al-
though people often assign an imperative quality 
to ethical goals, Durkheim (following Wundt) says 
that it would be erroneous to suppose that there is 
some special element that automatically makes ethi-
cal goals seem universal and intractable. Indeed, not 
only have matters of ethics been subject to extended 
debate but the motives that imbue ethical goals with 
authority also have little to do with particular ver-
sions of ethical goals. The first of what Wundt terms 
“imperative motives” is that of fear of restraint, 
more specifically—material restraints. The second 
imperative motive reflects people’s concerns with 
public opinion and its potential effects on them. 
A third, somewhat nobler, imperative acknowledg-
es people’s concerns about doing something that has 
some longer-term effects. Thus, whereas evil acts are 
envisioned as more transitory, good activities are 
thought to have more enduring consequences. The 
fourth, less common and yet most noble motive is that 
which people assign to the contemplation of ethical 
goals as ends to be pursued for themselves.
In summarizing these notions from Wundt, 
Durkheim next outlines a taxonomy that suggests 
that ethical goals may be pursued through norms 
directed variously towards individuals, societies, 
and yet broader realms of humanity.
In writing a conclusion to his consideration of Wun-
dt’s Ethics, Durkheim (E&SM:115-122) provides yet 
further insight into Wundt’s work and the analysis 
of human knowing and acting.
Thus, in the process of observing that Wundt has 
synthesized much of the thought of the German (re-
alist) theorists that Durkheim has earlier referenced, 
Durkheim (E&SM:115-116) contrasts Wundt’s ap-
proach to ethics with that of Immanuel Kant. Con-
sequentially, whereas Kant’s “moral imperative” is 
precise, invariant, presumed clear to all, and implies 
a mystical quality, Wundt is attentive to the variable, 
emergent, adjustive, and unevenly acknowledged 
nature of human morality. Moreover, Wundt also 
approaches morality as a complex phenomenon that 
can be comprehended scientifically.
Speaking more generally, Durkheim (E&SM:116-118) 
says that Wundt has advanced the analysis of ethics 
in two central ways. First, whereas most theorists have 
alleged that morality can be achieved as a philosoph-
ic process wherein one starts with a general principle 
and deductively arrives at a set of contingencies that 
promote social order, Wundt rejects this rationalist 
viewpoint and insists on developing a theory of mo-
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rality that is built centrally on observation of actual 
human practices and arrives at conceptions of ethics 
though the use of induction or comparative analysis. 
Subjecting reason to observation of actual historical 
cases, Wundt emphasizes the importance of consid-
ering the fuller array of ends that particular actions 
produce and attending to morality as an emergent, ad-
justive, reflective process rather than focusing directly 
on the intentions of moral viewpoints. 
Thus, beyond (a) the intentioned, conscious aspects of 
morality, the things that people do (b) also take them 
into areas that go beyond their consciousness and 
(c) these activities unintendedly or unwittingly generate 
other sets of processes that subsequently may impact 
on the things people do. As a result, people not only 
cannot know the longer-term effects of their own be-
haviors but, even as they act, they also are apt to be only 
partially cognizant of the fuller range of concerns, cir-
cumstances, and contingencies affecting their activities.
The second way that Wundt has made progress in 
the field of ethics is by focusing on ethics as a field 
amenable to scientific inquiry. Thus, while most theo-
rists have envisioned variations in the ethical practic-
es of different communities as more unique matters 
of artistic expression, Wundt intends to examine the 
ways that things have developed in this and that con-
text for the explicit purpose of comparative analysis.
As well, Durkheim notes, whereas all of the moral 
theorists he has discussed assume that the prima-
ry function of morality is to enable people to deal 
with one another more effectively and thus insure 
the survival of the group, Wundt observes this 
moderating effect takes place inadvertently and is 
best known after the fact (as opposed to representing 
a reason for invoking morality). 
The primary function of morality, Wundt contends, is 
to make the individuals who constitute the commu-
nity realize that they are not the whole or centering 
point of the society. Instead, they are only part of the 
whole and, as individuals, people are comparatively 
insignificant relative to the larger community.
It is the recognition of the importance of the communi-
ty-based other that makes society possible. Morality, 
thus, reflects the efforts of people to locate them-
selves in something that is more substantial, more 
enduring than themselves.
Continuing, Durkheim (E&SM:118-120) says that 
although society reflects this quest for “something 
more enduring” to which people might attach them-
selves, one still must ask from whence morality de-
rives its authority or obligatory quality.
In developing a response, Durkheim says that if one 
puts aside religious obligations associated with di-
vinity and also the social discipline associated with 
the potency of the community, then nothing is left. 
If everything were left to individual interests and 
inclinations, it would be futile to ask about a sense 
of obligation. Since obligations presume some out-
side source of constraint, how can one even be obli-
gated to oneself if there is nothing beyond oneself?
Pursuing this line of thought further, Durkheim says 
that people need to believe that the effects of their ac-
tions extend beyond the immediate present. Nothing, 
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he says, has an absolute value, including one’s own 
happiness. If things seem important, thus, it is because 
we value the comparisons they represent with respect 
to other things. Without these comparison points, and 
the goals they represent, life would be meaningless.
It is because of this, Durkheim stresses, that individu-
alism, because it detaches the individual from every-
thing, is so completely inadequate as a philosophic stance. It 
is for this reason too, Durkheim says, that Wundt places 
such great emphasis on society relative to the individ-
ual—for it is only within the community that people can 
achieve greater senses of individualized relevance.
Then, commenting on Wundt’s “excessive denigra-
tion of the individual,” Durkheim acknowledges 
the pleasures that people may experience on their 
own [albeit still as socialized beings]. Nevertheless, 
Durkheim (E&SM:120-121) says, it is because the in-
finite is so nebulous and discouraging that people 
need to have some sense of direction or at least that 
they are going somewhere. Thus, while societies do 
change over time, there still is a sense of continuity. 
Indeed, Durkheim observes, new societies do not 
suddenly emerge out of nothingness but inevitably 
build on the residues of the societies they replace.
It is with this notion in mind (E&SM:121-122) that 
Wundt claims that there are more singular, endur-
ing religious and moral ideals (oriented towards an 
overarching image of humanity) of which all com-
munities represent tentative approximations.16 Still, it 
16 As Durkheim later observes, Wundt is making a teleologi-
cal assumption here—that there is a single, rational morality 
to which all humanity consciously and unconsciously strives. 
This does not invalidate the exceptionally potent sociological 
quality of Wundt’s earlier analysis but draws attention to some 
is because of the more distinctive nature of religion 
and morality among civilized peoples that these 
more sharply delineated variants represent instruc-
tive departure points for subsequent observation and 
analysis of religion and morality as social essences.
Nevertheless, Durkheim notes, there are as many 
moralities as there are peoples and that the moral-
ities of all peoples are to be recognized as viable 
relative to their own place and time. Likewise, each 
community sets its own goods or ideals to which it 
strives until changes occur and community morali-
ties are readjusted as new ideals to be approximated. 
[Although Durkheim ends his portrayal of Wundt’s 
Ethics on a rather vague note, his analysis of ethics 
and German “pragmatism” is far from complete.]
Part IV: Conclusion: A. H. Post
Durkheim (E&SM:123-127) begins his conclusion 
to the set of essays embedded in his (1993 [1887]) 
statement by referencing John Stuart Mill’s (1806-
1873) distinction between “intuitive ethics” and 
“inductive ethics.” Those employing intuitive eth-
ics assume an a priori truth as a starting point and 
then proceed to derive more specific applications 
from this fundamental principle. Those engaged 
in inductive ethics claim to derive their primary 
principle from experience. Noting that the former is 
based on some notion of “the good” or “obligation,” 
Durkheim says that inductive ethics in Mill’s terms 
revolves around conceptions of utility.
of Wundt’s more presumptive, more prescriptive, much less 
pluralist sociological directions encountered in Volume III. 
While Durkheim also tries to maintain a consistent pluralist, 
process-oriented scientific analysis, he clearly at times (espe-
cially in Division of Labor and Suicide) falls into the same trap.
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Further, although the actual principles emphasized 
in the rationalist approaches of Kant and other intu-
itivists differ from those of Mill and the utilitarians, 
Durkheim says that both rely extensively on deduc-
tive methods. As well, since pure logic can make no 
claims whatsoever about content, both the rational-
ists and the utilitarians invariably build on some no-
tions of experience. In these respects, the differences 
between the two are not as great as might first seem.
Still, the more central failing of both sets of approach-
es, Durkheim stresses, is that they are not scientific. 
First, it is not apparent that ethics can be reduced to 
a simple motivating concept or principle. Likewise, 
pure logic (reasoning on its own) cannot establish 
ethical principles. Relying on external inferences, 
both sets of claims failed to examine the actualities, 
diversities, and complexities of social life.
If one is to acquire viable knowledge of people’s ethics, 
it will be necessary to examine the particulars in highly sus-
tained detail. It is not adequate to build on observations 
of more superficial sorts and it is entirely inappropriate 
to apply deductive logic to more complex phenomena. Be-
cause of the sheer complexity of moral phenomena, 
deductive reasoning is entirely inappropriate. Reason 
simply cannot substitute for sustained observation.
Continuing, Durkheim (E&SM:127-128) says that it 
is precisely because of the failings of the prevailing 
approaches to ethics that the German school, with 
its genuinely inductive method, is so consequential.
Providing an alternative to the transcendental logic 
of the Kantians that ignores scientific observation, 
as well as vague Utilitarian references to experience, 
the German (realist) school approaches ethics not 
only as a distinct field on its own but also one that is 
to be empirically investigated.
Elaborating further, Durkheim says that ethics has 
its own subject matter and, like other fields of scien-
tific inquiry, is to be built on observations, analysis, 
and progressive comparisons in the quest to induc-
tively arrive at a general set of principles. Further, 
because of its subject matter, Durkheim adds, ethics 
is not to be viewed as a simple extension of psychol-
ogy or sociology but is to be established as an inde-
pendent discipline in the social sciences.
Referencing two other sources (a British historian Les-
lie Stephen [1832-1904] and a German economist and 
political scientist Lorenz von Stein [1815-1890]) who 
also have contributed to this emergent German tra-
dition, Durkheim (E&SM:128-129) briefly, but directly 
engages “evolution” as a community-oriented concept.
Observing that all of those he has identified with 
the German school envision morality as develop-
ing in evolutionary terms, Durkheim says that it is 
essential to recognize that they are working with 
a very different conception of evolution than that 
associated with evolution as a biological process. 
It is necessary, he says, to be mindful of the limita-
tions of the biological analogy and not presuppose, 
as the (Italian) criminologists have done, that mat-
ters of morality can be explained in biological terms.
Instead, Durkheim (E&SM:129-130) insists, morality 
is to be approached as an independent field of study, 
as those in the German school have done. Never-
theless, he states, their methodology requires sub-
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stantial modification. Thus, despite the conceptual 
insights generated by the German school, their the-
ory is still too general. Also, like the Kantians and 
Utilitarians, the German school is still preoccupied 
with the quest for an overarching moral principle.17
Stating that none of the prevailing sciences can be re-
duced to a single principle or problem, Durkheim says 
that it is necessary to approach the study of morality in 
more explicitly open, inquisitive, detailed terms. Indeed, 
he says, it is premature to seek out overarching princi-
ples when there is so much to be learned about morality 
as a phenomenon. Likewise, it is to be recognized that 
morality is not a science in itself, but instead is to be ap-
proached as the subject matter of scientific inquiry.
Although conceding that some of the German schol-
ars he has referenced have embarked on more sus-
tained studies of the sort he is encouraging, Durkheim 
(E&SM:131-132) references Albert Hermann Post (1839-
1895), a Justice of the Courts of Bremen, as an exemplar 
of the agenda that he has in mind. Adapting a compar-
ative analytic approach to the detailed ethnological study 
of transformations of law, Durkheim envisions Post’s 
work as offering a more desirable methodology.
Saying that he is unable to summarize Post’s work in 
the present statement, Durkheim (E&SM:132-133) dis-
tinguishes historical approaches more generally from 
those that are more appropriate for the study of moral-
ity. Thus, he observes that most historians, in tracking 
the more particular developments within a single con-
17 It is here that Durkheim most directly parts company with 
Wilhelm Wundt who, later in Volume III of Ethics, foregoes 
some of his more purely scholarly standpoints and becomes 
more intent on establishing an overarching moral order. 
text, not only lack the resources necessary to develop 
adequate analytic comparisons but typically become 
so engrossed in fitting the details of their situations 
together that they forego interest in moving beyond 
their more immediate frames of reference. 
As a result, it will be the task of the moral theorist to 
develop analytic comparisons by building on these 
materials. Noting that this will be a demanding role 
to pursue in more comprehensive terms, Durkheim 
says that these scholars still may be able to develop 
a more limited set of comparisons at any time. Indeed, 
this seems necessary given the more idiographic, 
self-serving approaches adapted by most historians.
Durkheim (E&SM:134-135) concludes his statement 
by stating that the “science of morality” is only in 
a rudimentary state and will require patience, as 
well as perseverance for its fuller development.
After noting that some people are apt to find it dis-
concerting to realize that matters of morality have an 
emergent, often obscure quality that defies rational-
ism (presumably of both Kantian and Utilitarian sorts) 
and related applications of deductive logic, Durkheim 
says that the moralities that particular peoples have 
developed are to be appreciated for achieving a wis-
dom that surpasses that of the greatest genius.
Then, stating that we are a long way from knowing 
enough to define and regulate human morality (and 
that it is childish to suppose otherwise), Durkheim 
says that it is by drawing on the lessons of history that 
we may arrive at more viable, more informed concep-
tions of human morality. Indeed, morality is to be un-
derstood within the parameters of human history.
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In Perspective
Although generally unknown in academic circles—
notably including sociology, Emile Durkheim’s (1993 
[1887]) “La Science Positive de la Morale en Alle-
magne” represents an essential cornerstone for more 
adequately comprehending Durkheim’s sociological 
productions, as well as for more fully appreciating his 
emphasis on sociology as a distinctively consequential 
realm of scholarship. 
Durkheim seems likely to have had only a comparatively 
short time to learn about, absorb, and develop the mate-
rials he presents in this 1887 statement. Nevertheless, his 
(1885-1886) encounter with German pragmatism, and es-
pecially Wilhelm Wundt’s Ethics, would have a profound 
impact on Durkheim’s subsequent scholarship. 
This influence is much less evident in Durkheim’s 
best-known works (1947 [1893]; 1951 [1897]; 1958 [1895]), 
wherein he adapts more pronounced rationalist and 
structuralist emphases. Thus, the continuities of 
Durkheim’s thought with that of Wilhelm Wundt and 
the other German scholars that Durkheim acknowl-
edges in “the scientific study of morality” would be 
only partially sustained as Durkheim pursued aspects 
of his earlier career as a French scholar. Relatedly, 
there is much in The Division of Labor in Society (1947 
[1893]), The Rules of Sociological Method (1958 [1895]), 
and especially Suicide (1951 [1897]) that would appear 
to support the claim that Durkheim learned about so-
ciology from Auguste Comte, Charles Renouvier, and 
some other French academics. Still, it is evident that 
his learning about sociology does not stop there. In-
deed, Durkheim’s 1887 statement has a very distinc-
tive pragmatist emphasis and is of great consequence 
for comprehending the overall flow and directions of 
Durkheim’s subsequent sociological scholarship.
On returning to France after his study leave in Ger-
many, Durkheim appears to have encountered con-
siderable criticism for his interest in German social 
realism. In addition to French rebuffs associated with 
long-standing Franco-German tensions and hostili-
ties, Durkheim would have been accused by some as 
placing undue emphasis on history, religion, and in-
ductive reasoning in the midst of the French emphasis 
on rationalism, scientism, quantification, and deduc-
tive reasoning. While achieving success as a French 
academic, Durkheim most likely was troubled by as-
pects of his early texts (1947 [1893]; 1951 [1897]; 1958 
[1895])—even as he worked his way through these 
materials and endeavored to accommodate the para-
digmatic structuralist/pragmatist discrepancies. 
Still, as a young scholar intensely pursuing an ac-
ademic career and dependent on his associates for 
confirmations thereof, Durkheim’s challenge would 
be one of acceptably fitting his work into mainstream 
French social thought while sustaining essential in-
tellectual continuities with the (pragmatist) socio-
logical framework he outlined in 1887. By contrast, 
most of his later (1902-1914) materials exhibit a pro-
nounced attentiveness to pragmatist social thought.
It is worth noting, as well, that in his 1902-1914 works 
Durkheim seldom acknowledges the existence of the 
1893, 1895, 1897 texts for which he is still best known 
in sociology. Instead, consistent with his 1887 paper, 
Emile Durkheim (1902-1914) contends that the princi-
pal methodological resources of sociology are history 
and ethnography. 
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Relatedly, there is the more explicit emphasis on attend-
ing to the flows of community life, envisioning activity 
and interchange as meaningful, socially interconnect-
ed sets of processes to be best comprehended through 
sustained comparative analysis. Durkheim will em-
phasize the centrality of the group throughout his ca-
reer, but in his later works (as with his 1887 paper), it 
is the community as consisting of developmentally in-
terfused arenas of meaningfully engaged activity and 
interchange (not abstracted sets of factors or variables) 
that he defines as particularly consequential. 
Even though references to Wilhelm Wundt and the 
other German social realist theorists Durkheim dis-
cusses in his 1887 statement are notably absent in his 
later works, it appears that Wilhelm Wundt has been 
Durkheim’s (and hence also our own) long-term in-
tellectual companion. 
Albeit inadvertently, in developing his 1887 paper, 
Durkheim also helps establish the links between clas-
sical Greek thought and our own time (Prus 2004; 
2007a; 2015; 2017). Durkheim seems largely inattentive 
to the Greek (predominantly Aristotelian) foundations 
of German social realist thought, even as he explicit-
ly builds on Wundt’s historically informed analysis 
of the study of morality (Ethics). Thus, whereas Wun-
dt makes direct reference to Aristotle in developing 
Ethics, Durkheim has focused more exclusively on 
the processes by which morality takes shape and (re-
latedly) approaches the study of morality as denoting 
emergent sets of social processes that are essential for 
comprehending all realms of community life.18
18 It may be observed that Durkheim makes explicit reference 
to the centrality of Aristotle’s Categories for human knowing 
and acting (and survival) in developing The Elementary Forms 
of the Religious Life.
Nevertheless, Durkheim has absorbed much of the 
intellectual tradition that Wundt articulates in Eth-
ics. Moreover, later, in tracing the developmental 
flow of education and scholarship from the classical 
Greek era to his own time, Durkheim’s (1977 [1904-
1905]) The Evolution of Educational Thought (also see 
Prus 2012) very much parallels the intellectual od-
yssey on which Wilhelm Wundt (in Ethics) had em-
barked in his study of the analysis of morality.
Likewise, despite the remarkably extensive analysis 
that Durkheim develops in his (1915 [1912]) The Ele-
mentary Forms of the Religious Life, those familiar with 
his 1887 paper will find much in Durkheim’s 1912 text 
that resonates with Wundt’s analysis of religion in 
Ethics. Indeed, even though Durkheim does not ref-
erence Wilhelm Wundt in The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life and this rather massive text goes well 
beyond the materials that Durkheim discusses in his 
1887 paper, the conceptual base of Durkheim’s 1912 
text seems centrally indebted to Wilhelm Wundt and 
the German social realist/pragmatist tradition. The 
material presented in his 1887 statement, thus, represents 
the key for understanding Durkheim’s longer-term con-
tributions to pragmatist sociology as the study of human 
group life. 
Whereas one encounters some insights consistent 
with Durkheim’s exposure to the social realists even 
in his more structuralist texts (The Division of Labor in 
Society, The Rules of Sociological Method, and Suicide), 
the intellectual tradition that Durkheim encountered 
in Germany served as a highly consequential con-
ceptual and methodological base for the much more 
notably humanist or pragmatist position he develops 
in Moral Education (1961 [1902-1903]), The Evolution of 
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Educational Thought (1977 [1904-1905]), The Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life (1915 [1912]), and Pragma-
tism and Sociology (1983 [1913-1914]). By examining 
Durkheim’s (1993 [1887]) statement on German re-
alism, we begin more fully to appreciate the foun-
dations of his later (1902-1914) “sociological pragma-
tism” along with its implications both for reorienting 
the sociological venture more generally and extend-
ing pragmatist (and interactionist) scholarship more 
specifically.
This latter (1902-1914) set of materials indicates 
the remarkable potency of Durkheim’s pragmatist 
scholarship and provides a valuable set of conceptu-
al resources for the revitalization of sociology as the 
study of human knowing and acting. These texts also 
represent an important means of injecting great-
er realism into the philosophy of knowledge. Still, 
there is another side to the humanist/pragmatist so-
ciology Durkheim addresses in his 1887 text.
Like Wilhelm Wundt, who prior to adapting a his-
torical, pragmatist approach had experienced con-
siderable success as an experimental psychologist, 
Emile Durkheim was unable to subsequently redi-
rect the flows of sociological analysis as much as he 
(1887, 1902-1914) had intended. This appears to have 
reflected (a) the long-standing rationalist, structur-
alist emphases of the broader academic community, 
(b) the more mechanistic, ahistorical scientistic em-
phasis of most 17th-20th century social theorists, and 
(c) the ever-present quest for solutions to the “social 
problems of the day” and the associated academ-
ic positions and resources available to those who 
could more effectively make claims to facilitate scien-
tifically informed solutions.
As indicated in his 1890s texts, Emile Durkheim also 
became caught up in this latter set of emphases—
and the cross-pressures of maintaining pragmatist 
sensibilities regarding the centrality of human lived 
experience amidst the rationalist, structuralist, and 
social problems-oriented approaches of his day.
Like other traditions in community life, academic 
realities are resilient to change (as both Wundt and 
Durkheim emphasized in their later works). Still, it 
is through the efforts (more intense, as well as more 
partial at times) of a corpus of dedicated, commu-
nity-oriented scholars such as Wilhelm Wundt and 
Emile Durkheim that we have been able to sustain 
a focus on the study of human knowing and act-
ing amidst the traditions and allures of rationalist, 
structuralist thought and the pressures to imitate 
the physical sciences (through an emphasis on fac-
tors, variables, and quantitative inquiry) in the so-
cial sciences.19
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